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Historically public sector organizations have adopted a positivist organizational 
model that relies on highly centralized decision-making structures. Does such a classical 
bureaucratic model serve government organizations well given the intrinsic lack of 
accountability in traditional hierarchical administrative organizations particularly in as much 
as positivist models openly conflict with the ideals of pluralist democratic political systems 
and processes? Hierarchical structures, by definition, depend on a centralized, and 
exclusionary, decision-making process that the positivist organizational model holds to be 
"efficient." In the highly diffuse, and decentralized decision-making processes of the 
political realm the classical positivist model cannot be readily sustained. Philosophically, can 
positivist models of public administration continue to flourish in a post-industrial, 
postmodern world? 
Cultural context has long provided a framework for organizational structures. 
Organizational thought and structure has tended to reflect the prevailing philosophic schools 
of the day. Traditional government structures have been hierarchical with strict vertical and 
horizontal integration. Such organizational structures reflected the management systems 
employed by the private sector based largely on an industrial era of production-based 
organizational systems. 
Now that the post-industrial, Information Age predominates the world economy, 
private sector organizational structures tend to emphasize disintegration, or decentralization, 
of management and decision-making processes while concomitantly stressing concepts of 
entrepreneurism, accountability, and globalization. Today's postmodern world demands that 
organizations: develop sophisticated communicative systems (supported by ever advancing 
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information technologies), heighten multi-cultural sensitivity in order to embrace cultural 
diversity, and promote collaborative decision-making schemes so as to encourage heightened 
levels of participation. Consequently, governmental structures are being recast in light of 
the evolution of social structures and shifting political decision-making models. 
This essay shall first explore the continued evolution of administrative theory to 
draw parallels with erstwhile social, political, and economic trends, and thereby establish a 
periodicity of organizational theory. Tracking the historical context of organizational 
systems enables the researcher to establish the overarching philosophical frameworks of 
organizational theories in governance from inception to the contemporary period. 
Next, it is essential to survey the public sector's adaptation of decentralized decision-
making systems and postmodern organizational structures premised upon communicative 
systems, information technologies, and discourse driven collaborative approaches. A public 
sector organization will be examined, through two case studies, within the context of 
creating hybrid positivist and postmodern organizational systems that emphasize present 
societal values. 
Lastly, postmodern administrative systems will be analyzed through the lens of 
citizen participation in order to gauge the effects of administrative bureaucracy on 
democratic processes. Postmodern philosophy tends to embrace inclusive processes and 
eschew outmoded, exclusionary positivist power-knowledge relationships. By extension, 
postmodern organizational systems tend to adopt inclusion as a primary value and encourage 
part1c1patory processes. 
An Overview of Organizational Theory and Public Sector Organizations 
Max Weber is considered to be the father of the modern rational organization. 
Classical organizations were outlined by Weber who coined the term "bureaucracy" (Miller, 
1963). The six principles of classical organizations are: 1. Areas of jurisdiction are fixed by 
laws and organizational regulations; 2. Authority rests in an extant hierarchy; 3. 
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Management is based on information; 4. Expertise and training are essential to 
professionalism; 5. Organizational structure is rooted in the concept of career; 6. 
Management adheres to rules. These are the fundamental tenets of modern rational 
organizations. Philosophically, Weber was an apologist for capitalism in that his work 
extolled the virtues of an organizational system he saw as eminently rational and empirical. 
Weber's thesis came to light during the zenith of functionalism, witness Frederick Taylor and 
the movement in Scientific Management (Davis, 1996). 
Luther Gulick refined Weber's model and adapted it to American public 
organizations. Gulick rose to prominence during the New Deal whereupon he stressed 
"efficient operations" in organizational structures (Davis, 1996). Gulick was a proponent of 
a strong centralized government with an increased role in the lives of American citizens. No 
doubt the backdrop of the New Deal provides the significant intellectual impetus behind 
Gulick's organizational theories. Administrative management was central to the disposition 
of new found government power. 
Bureaucratic rationality and scientific management had a profound influence on the 
public administration theorists of the period. Gulick considered reified activity and ideology 
central to organizational efficiency (Davis, 1996). In other words, the vocational activity 
comes to embody a strictly abstract, or rational autonomy-ultimately rendering that activity 
devoid of its fundamental nature-severing the relationship between the task and its 
designed objective, or goal. The mechanization of organizational activity is merely a 
byproduct of what Gulick felt was the innately rational essence of organizational activity and 
thereby the basis for its efficiency. Organizational tasks could be separated from human 
thought, values, and needs. 
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Subsequent to Gulick's seminal work on the empirical rational view of public 
administration organizations came the work of Herbert Simon. Simon stressed the 
rationality of the organization as, "synonymous with the efficiency of the administrative unit 
itself (Davis, 1996, p.98). The 'means-ends' reasoning process was central to Simon's 
emphasis upon the decision-making process. Hierarchical structure delimits individual 
decision-making through the authoritative structure-bounded rationality. Simon's model is 
predicated upon a system of 'satisficing,' whereby individuals choose courses of action that 
are satisfactory enough, given constraints upon available resources rather than a 
maximization of individual choices. Choice and politics are, theoretically, subjugated by the 
rationality of administrative management. Rationality rests upon a theoretical divide that 
persists between administration and politics. Simon's work corresponded with the 
prominence of post-War operations research and the subsequent rise to prominence of 
technical expertise. 
Vincent Ostrom sought to humanize the work of Gulick and Simon by introducing a 
more democratic approach to public administration. According to Ostrom, traditional 
administrative theories that emphasize rational decision-making within hierarchical structures 
are incompatible with liberal, constitutional ideals. Democracy is lost in the labyrinth of 
organizational structures. A paradox is born of the monocentrism of hierarchical 
organizations and the fundamental emphasis upon individual liberties as expressed by citizen 
participation in the constitutional system. 
For Ostrom the individual, not the system of management, becomes the basic unit of 
analysis (Davis, 1996). Authority does not rest within the hierarchy, rather Ostrom devises a 
system of fragmented decision-making and an overlap of authority. Decision-making rests 
in individual choice and is patterned after traditional liberal-democratic schemes. The 
individual is the first level of sovereignty, community the second, then the state, and so 
forth. Enlightened self-interest becomes the guiding principle of decision-making. Ostrom 
relies upon an individual's cognition of the general welfare as in her/his self-interest. 
Human kind is considered social with personal and collective needs-requiring mutual 
effort. Ostrom formulated his organizational theories during the late Sixties and early 
Seventies, in an era of socio-political turmoil that challenged the very notions of public 
authority. 
Chris Argyris explored organizational phenomenon under the aegis of humanistic-
behavioral psychology and management. He emphasized organizational structures as 
systems. According to Argyris, organizations are normative in that social reality is a 
construct (Davis, 1996). The Humanist School makes human existence, and subsequent 
self-recognition the center of organizational structure. Quality of life, therefore, becomes a 
natural outgrowth of Argyris' theoretical framework. 
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Argyris decries formal organizational models as dysfunctional and unhealthy for the 
individual. The repression of interpersonal relationships decreases the capacity to learn and 
grow. Social awareness and action, however, must await the awakening of self-awareness. 
Collective action is thus a tacit agreement to achieve, or at least aspire to, self-awareness and 
is not necessarily beholden to common involvement. The cultural context under which 
Argyris operates is the humanist and existential period of the Seventies and Eighties. 
Postmodernity: Philosophical Underpinnings 
In the postmodern era new, value-based perspectives emphasizing culture and the 
importance of communicative systems constitute systemic upheaval. Public administration 
has a new locus derived, to a great degree, of the omnipresence of information and the 
continued subjectivity of knowledge. Postmodernism forms the ideological underpinnings 
of the Information Age, and, as such, new ground for organizational theory and public 
administration. 
8 
The philosophical underpinnings of postmodernism currently contribute a great deal 
to organizational and administrative theory. The fundamental epistemic, ontological, and 
metaphysical foundations of postmodern philosophy derive of the structuralist school of 
philosophy that sought to remedy the abject nihilism that accompanied the subjectivism 
borne of the existentialist philosophy (Kurzweil, 1980). Structuralism sought the common 
bonds present in human relations, and in doing so applied an interdisciplinary approach to 
unraveling the fundamental questions of essence, meaning, language, and social institutions. 
Since many structuralist philosophers are also considered postmodern thinkers-especially 
Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida-the tenets of structuralism are expressed through current 
postmodern thought. Briefly, the key elements of postmodern philosophy require a precis 
of the major thinkers of the postmodern movement. 
Fox and Miller (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) succinctly distill the essence of postmodern 
philosophy. Lacan proposes that institutions are the structures in which antagonisms are 
played-out, where interests are denied or fulfilled and values are upheld or denigrated, 
whereby an institution is a reflection of the dichotomous self. In the main, the divide 
between the conscious and unconscious. Moreover, for Lacan language is at the center of 
social structures. 
Foucault views institutions as sources of domination (Lynch and Dicker, 1998). The 
system of power is a structure of the discourse, actions, and institutions of knowledge. 
Furthermore, knowledge is controlled through a system of power operating through rules of 
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exclusion. Organizations are totalitarian mechanisms of power and every social institution is 
a knowledge system that structures human domination. 
Lyotard (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) holds that scientific knowledge has been reduced 
to commodity status, for it is a major force of production. Society is imagined as an 
objective reality, a unified totality in structural functionalism. In other words, the values are 
ignored in favor of 'facts'-what ensues is the perpetuation of the subject-object schism 
endemic Western society and philosophy. Who decides what knowledge is? For Lyotard 
this is a matter of political struggle. Science is but a tool of the power elite. Power produces 
the knowledge that affirms it-science, therefore, legitimizes itself out of necessity. Lyotard 
places narrative knowledge on par with science. The outcome of Lyotard's work is an 
acceptance of indeterminacy of cultural products and practices as the distinctive signature of 
postmodernity, beyond ideology, values, and judgment. 
Rorty (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) embraces the pragmatists like Dewey who, " ... tum 
away from the theoretical scientists and to the engineers and the social workers and to use 
science and philosophy as tools [to make people more comfortable and secure]" (Lynch and 
Dicker, 1998, p. 426). He sees pragmatism as a solution to the pitfall of subjectivism that 
post-Structuralism is unable to resolve. 
Derrida (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) claims that language is largely symbolic so as to 
create an absence of both object as well as referential points, thereby allowing the existence 
of many different possibilities of interpretation. Thus, according to Derrida there can be no 
correct interpretation of words or even the intention of the speaker. Words are not constant 
but are historically and culturally conditioned and their relevance is determined by the 
context. Words are not immutable, rather a meaning vacuum exists-if no meaning is more 
valid than another then multi-cultural perspectives are all equally valid. 
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Finally, Baudrillard (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) asserts that discourse is indeterrninable, 
meaning cannot be stabilized amongst multiple, often competing, interpretations. A line no 
longer separates reality from the image. Media can no longer be a "mediating" power 
between reality and perception. Rather, the medium has become the message, and more 
importantly a manipulative force. 
The Interpretation of Language and the Signification of Knowledge 
Postmodemism, and critical theory, are oft assailed as contributing much in the way 
of critique, but little in the form of substance to the realm of practical solutions for real-
world predicaments. Yet, it is largely the pervasive positivist social framework that indicts 
the theory behind, and ready application of, postmodern thought. Essentially postmodern 
thought initiates through an entirely different perspective towards the estimation, 
investigation, and resolution of real-world dilemmas. It has been the relative failure of 
positivism, under the aegis of empirical science and expertise, to deal efficaciously with 
complex social problems that has lead to the inexorable embrace of postmodern philosophy, 
derived of the influence of the humanities, by the social sciences, thereby allowing the 
subsequent re-evaluation of the basic tenets of human discovery. 
Postmodern thought eschews credulity of metanarratives and the fixing of implicit 
meaning. These two factors are intimately correlated by way of postmodern philosophy's 
embrace of language as both an instrument of enslavement and avenue to human freedom. 
Additionally, postmodemism universally recognizes the crisis in representation and the 
dilemma of subject-author. Language and knowledge are culturally conditioned and are at 
the center of the establishment and preservation of power throughout society. 
Current knowledge is viewed as a condition of "language games." The positivist, 
Enlightenment view of a "grand theory" of knowledge promoting a singular vision of both 
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science and society has been thoroughly rejected by postmodern thinkers (Carlas and 
Smircich, 1999). Lyotard, advancing the seminal work of Wittgenstein, proposed that 
legitimate knowledge can only reside in "small stories" or "modest narratives." Such a 
situation allows multiple ontological and epistemological paradigms to coexist. The very 
nature of knowledge itself has come under scrutiny as postmodernism views knowledge as a 
process that constitutes itself and that which it purports to study. For organizational theory 
the implication is that organizations have come to be viewed as a socio-political system 
rather than an uninterested, fact-finding operation. 
In postmodern terms the question of knowledge inevitably leads to an examination 
of the substance, or meaning, of language. There can be no essence with which to ground 
meaning. Therefore, the positivist conception of knowledge is made utterly invalid. 
Postmodernism renders language completely subjective. Words can continuously be 
reinterpreted. Even the author's intention is subject to constant scrutiny as any attempts by 
the author to elucidate specific intent are viewed as fodder for subsequent reinterpretation. 
Consequently, language is a system of differences (Carlas and Smircich, 1999). 
Positivist thought relies upon the exclusion of one meaning in order to allow for the 
inclusion of another. This deliberate exclusion results in systemic self-perpetuation and the 
closing of the vocabulary of the profession. It is a process that preserves power in the hands 
of those that control the language and thereby much of the relevant discourse. What results 
is an institutional politics of knowledge-making. Lyotard supposed that the intercourse 
between institutions that define a particular knowledge, as well as the language through 
which that knowledge is created, constitutes an unstable system of signification. This 
intercourse among institutions is not determined by structural imperatives, nor higher order 
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power or authority, but emerges as individuals signify and resignify the social milieu (Carlas 
and Smircich, 1999). 
Postmodern Methodologies 
Without lifting the fog of positivism, as it were, individuals are subject to the 
insidious forces of control that belie the facade of neutrality that positivist thought seeks to 
impart. Positivist social systems convey an air of regularity and a condition of 
incontrovertibility, yet hold surreptitious effects that serve to render control over human 
action. 
Jeremy Bentham formulated the basic tenets that later became the philosophical 
school of utilitarianism. Bentham, along with other prominent thinkers behind 
utilitarianism, sought to optimize social structures just as Frederick Taylor sought to perfect 
the structures of capital accumulation, mainly through the positivist principles of scientific 
management. For instance, the panopticon was envisioned by Bentham as a labor saving 
penal system that employed a guard within a watch-tower centered in a twelve-sided 
structure forming an efficient prison. The cells of the facility were to be back-lit so as to 
allow constant surveillance of the inmates, without the attendant visibility of the guard. 
With the passage of time the inmates would internalize the scrutiny of the guard whether or 
not there was a watch present. The prisoners' behavior would reflect the unceasing scrutiny. 
Conformity could thus be assured. 
Foucault reconstituted the concept of the panopticon as a postmodern method of 
describing the internalization of the social forces of control (Kerr, 1999). For instance, in 
organizational terms the presence of "liberating" organizational systems, e.g. total quality 
management (TQM), just-in-time management, are mechanisms that subjugate the worker 
by placing the burden for oversight squarely upon the individual. These organizational 
methods decentralize power, institutionalize new modes of control, and are in no way 
intended to truly eliminate hierarchy. 
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Foucault's research on political rationalities questions the very nature of the political. 
Rose distills Foucault's political thought to a simple formula in which, how power is 
transacted, the historical systems of expertise, and the ensuing social divisions that derive of 
liberal philosophy are the interrelated conditions that are requisite for "responsibilized" 
democracy (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996). In essence, Foucault considers liberalism not 
as the absence of government but, instead, as the creator of society and its own self-
legitimation. Stated otherwise, liberalism gives rise to a concept of society as outside the 
political realm. Yet, at once liberalism exerts control over society through the imposition of 
"neutral" expertise while professing the autonomy of social structures. And, the study of 
social systems, through the social sciences, allows the methods of social control to become 
legitimized via the perception of impartiality even as it provides the means to assess and 
regulate society. 
Consequently, under liberalism the separation of the state and society is not a result 
of the absence of government, per se, but instead is the means to reconcile the 
inconsistencies of exerting control without the overt mechanisms of power, i.e. force. 
Rather than promote individual sovereignty over that of the state, liberalism creates a 
scheme to literally manage society. Hindess (Barry, Osborne, and Rose, 1996) astutely points 
to Locke's defense of parental power and his qualification that while individuals may have a 
right to natural freedom, they are born ignorant and without the use of reason. 
Moreover, Foucault created a method of revealing the shortcomings of positivism 
through an investigatory process known as genealogy. Whereas positivist science seeks to 
establish a cause and effect relationship, genealogies serve to illustrate that the illusion of 
cause and effect exists only due to the denial, or exclusion, of other possible stories. 
Genealogies allow a dislocation of subject from the relational institution (Boyne, 1990). 
Thus, subjectivity is not an origin. Rather, subjectivity is both the producer and effect of a 
set of particular narratives and practices. The crux of the genealogy is to show how 
"scientific" knowledge is simply a system of power relationships. 
14 
Foucault's anti-essentialist philosophy attacks the positivist rationale that all socio-
political phenomena can be reduced to a transcendent or essential nature (Wilkin, 1999). 
This reductionism alludes to certain universal characteristics that transcend culture, history, 
and society. Also, positivism desires to reduce social studies to constituent components so 
as to produce a body of social sciences that is predictive and probabilistic. This apparent 
neutral objectivism is in actuality the misapplication of scientific authority to order society 
into simple components that deny society's diversity and complexity. 
Additionally, Foucault continues his anti-essentialist thought by criticizing 
positivism's tendency toward biologism (Wilkin, 1999). Positivism purports to understand 
individual behavior and human motivations by reducing individuals to a set of fundamental 
biological drives. The outgrowth of biologism, as Foucault terms this phenomena, is that 
social institutions can be understood in terms of human motivations and the biological 
drives that shape those motivations. Foucault argues that under such ideology human action 
comes to be seen as a sequence of normalities and pathologies and, as such, a source of 
power and knowledge or a means of regulating society. 
Dumm's (1996) Foucauldian genealogical study of prisons and democracy dislocates 
power from wherein it traditionally resides, namely with the state, and instead establishes a 
link between power and human desire. Thus, Foucault's concepts fully contradict the liberal 
supposition that individuals operate strictly autonomously while the state simply arbiters a 
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body of negative rights. For Dumm, as well as Foucault, personal liberties are not 
expressions of autonomy. Rather, society conditions political outcomes, whereby 
democratic politics are reduced to simply the politics of human desires (Dumm, 1996). As a 
result, any discussion of democracy, and operation of authority, cannot be readily 
distinguished from serious discussion of cultural politics. 
The study of culture and language was the provenance of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
Wittgenstein's language games serve to explain the nature of human expression. Each type 
of utterance, e.g. denotative, prescriptive, etc., has its own set of rules. These rules are not 
self-legitimating nor do they have an independent foundation. Rather, the rules are 
constituted in practice. Moreover, the rules are absolutely necessary for communication to 
take place. Language games form the basis for the postmodern attack upon metanarratives 
and universal meaning, for speech is seen as wholly pluralistic. 
In his Tractatus Wittgenstein ( 1961) poses the dichotomy that the world is composed 
of facts, not of objects (Garver and Lee, 1994). Facts determine the veracity of propositions, 
while objects comprise the world and determine the meaning of signs. All signs have a 
correlate object. Therefore, within the world truth is an empirical phenomena and meaning 
is transcendental. For Derrida meaning is determined by structures. Thus, there can be 
nothing independent of structures. In other words, Derrida denies the existence of a 
practical world of fact as well as a psychological world interpreted through sensory data. 
The crux of these philosophical observations is akin to the theory of relativity and quantum 
mechanics undoing Newtonian determinism. Derrida regards all language as radically 
metaphorical. The upshot to Derrida's position is that truth cannot be determined. Words, 
as used in metaphors, have multiple meanings. Since context determines meaning a word 
can have multiple interpretations. 
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In contrast to Foucault's genealogy, Derrida relies upon deconstruction, or 
philosophical meditations, to analyze social phenomenon (Derrida, 1973). Deconstructions 
are close analytical readings of texts for language, especially that written in the margins, 
between the lines, as asides, and as footnotes to the main text (Derrida and Caputo, 1997). 
This method relies upon exposing the meaning that the author is attempting to obscure. 
The premise behind deconstruction is that language is always beyond the author's control. 
Such analysis discovers words that are central to the meaning of the text. Then, the analyst 
identifies an opposite word that may be concealed behind the central word. In this manner 
the analyst contemplates the meaning of both terms. Both terms are so rendered indistinct. 
Deconstruction aims to understand the constitution of textual knowledge, especially the 
exclusion of language that positivist knowledge requires in order to manipulate meaning. 
Orthodoxy: The Failure of Positivist Administration 
Fox and Miller (1995) categorize traditional administrative theory, that which is 
founded on neutral administration through technocracy and procedural democracy, as an 
orthodoxy that seeks to sublimate the innate conflict within the political process. Certainly, 
positivist administration has been discredited for its many shortcomings including allowing 
far too much, or too little, administrative discretion in policy formulation and 
implementation alike (Fox and Miller, 1995). 
Orthodoxy, or positivist administration, is premised upon the representative-
democratic accountability feedback loop. Unfortunately, the loop model fails to perform as 
promised in that the political aspect of the politics-administration dichotomy does not 
systemically support the democratic process. Indeed, the administrative system is mired in 
organizational processes, e.g. hierarchy, rules, etc., that alienate the citizen from the 
democratic system, whether that citizen is a member of the administrative organization, a 
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potential recipient of agency services, or simply as a member of the larger community with a 
vested interest in agency outcomes. 
Furthermore, the imposition of ethics or performance criteria as methods of 
circumscribing administrative discretion only serves to proscribe the possibilities of 
increased democratic processes. Constitutionalism, whereby administrative systems are 
legitimized by means of reference to an higher order, is merely a vain attempt to rescue the 
foundering positivist administrative system. Unfortunately, constitutionalism does little to 
fundamentally alter the defective loop model. It merely shifts the focus from the genuine 
issue of unrealized democratic principles due to a well established power system, e.g. iron 
triangles, campaign finance, etc., to the fashioned argument of culpability of an entrenched 
bureaucracy. 
Likewise, the communitarian response to the extant positivist administrative system 
is to replace the suspect conventions of the modern system with the principles of a fully 
energized civism. Communitarianism is historically, ontologically, and epistemological 
distinct from positivist administrative systems. According to communitarian thought, citizen 
action is a requisite for social, political, cultural, and individual fulfillment. Never the less, 
communitarianism is untenable from a practical perspective in that contemporary citizens 
may be unwilling or unable to devote significant temporal and financial resources towards 
achieving an enlightened participatory governance. 
The Role of Language: Discourse and Administration 
Postmodern philosophy, predominantly by way of the views of Habermas, Foucault, 
Derrida, and Wittgenstein, has made significant inroads into the study of both administration 
and organization. For postmodern thinkers, language and communication lie at the crux of 
wielding power, by structuring knowledge in order to control social systems. On the 
contrary, language may also be considered a means of increasing democratization and 
participation through discourse and recognition of the subjectivity of knowledge. 
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Farmer (1995) calls for public administration to fundamentally alter the language of 
the discipline. In Farmer's scheme of reflexive interpretation the central subject is the 
underlying content of language. As a derivation of the deconstruction that Derrida employs 
as a method of uncovering hidden meanings and identifying alternate forms of knowledge, 
Farmer relies upon reflexive critical analysis to uncover signification in order to broaden the 
understanding of the essence of administration. Researchers in administration tend to see 
the world through the lens of administration, thereby excluding other viewpoints. 
Additionally, Farmer assails what he asserts are the false assumptions, that underlie 
administration. First, Farmer identifies administration's preoccupation with particularism. 
The field segments meaning, e.g. public/ private, and circumscribes study, e.g. national/ sub-
national. He proposes a focus on programmatic and political concerns in lieu of 
administrative function. Second, administration's obsession with scientism is in its own 
detriment. Administration assumes that methods applicable to the natural sciences will 
operate in the realm of social problems. The search for universal truth is a sham. Third, 
technologism, or the tendency towards embracing administrative fads, will not be the 
panacea for administrative ills. Administration is a low tech endeavor. Last, the positivist 
acceptance of capitalism as rational and a source for collective action, is absurd. 
Administration must empower public officials with true sources of legitimation. 
Language forms one's theoretical framework, and constitutes the human world. 
Wittgenstein said, " ... the limits of my language are the limits of my world ... " (Wittgenstein, 
1961; p.115). The import of Wittgenstein's observation is that facts can never be objective. 
Instead, they require an observer to express a proposition that is reflective of the observer's 
constitution (the set of concepts and perspectives that comprises that person's use of 
language). Reflexivity supposes that administrative theory can incorporate alternate 
perspectives based on other's language, or sets of assumptions (Farmer, 1995). 
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Fox and Miller (1995) are interested in connecting with citizens through the 
transformation of knowledge, and language. Citizen mobilization is considered central to 
the process of governance, and transpires through the replacement of positivist, technocracy 
with an expanded discourse. Discourse theory focuses on the problems of public awareness. 
Words and symbols have been estranged from authentic discourse. Words have become 
self-referential, the narrowing of context so as to disallow outside interpretations through 
the monologic media of discourse. In other words, alternate meanings have been 
intentionally excluded in order to dictate the discourse. Public entrepreneurs engage in 
simulated politics through the manipulation of abstractions and symbols rather than 
engaging in substantive policy formulation. 
Accordingly, Fox and Miller propose moving beyond traditional hierarchy and 
bureaucratic organizations, and advocate establishment of a public energy field. Within the 
realm of the public field no person may be excluded from the policy-making debate. Fox 
and Miller look to Habermas' theory of authentic speech sets for guidance. Authentic 
speech is predicated upon: A. the sincerity of the speaker; B. the clarity of expression; C. 
accuracy of claims made; D . relevance of utterances to the context of the discussion. When 
the presence of any of these principles is called into doubt, the speaker must support or 
withdraw the claim. In Fox and Miller's model the administrator's role becomes proactive 
simply by listening. 
However, it may be difficult to simply accept the wholesale leap in thought that must 
inevitably accompany postmodern philosophy. Rather, it may be more prudent to adopt key 
postmodern tenets while working within the extant positivist framework. The essay 
proposes that many organizations have tacitly adopted and currently operate within such a 
hybrid, or adaptive paradigm. 
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SECTION TWO-PHILOSOPHICAL FOUDATIONS 
Positivism, the Market, and Postmodemism 
As with prior philosophical movements, postmodernism did not completely supplant 
positivism. Quite the contrary, the two perspectives restlessly coexist. Postmodern 
organizational theories have been co-opted in part by a renewed positivist retort-theories 
that have adopted certain postmodern tenets. The positivist response operates under the 
premise of including market-based principles to allow for agency accountability, higher levels 
of participation, and increased efficiency in organizational structures. 
Managerialism, or the new public management movement, proffers the image of 
government as a competitive model. The National Performance Review (now National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government) seeks to decrease administrative red-tape and 
devolve centralization in order to increase administrative discretion and release the 
stranglehold of central authorities (Rockman; Farazmand, 1997). Such attempts to recast 
government as marketplace are bound to revive questions of bureaucratic accountability and 
the lack of participatory structures. Peters (1996) justly asserts that managerialism renews 
the politics-administration dichotomy. As public servants are explicitly viewed in terms of 
managerial tasks, elected officials' reliance upon the expertise of the bureaucracy permits 
administrative agencies a very important hand in policy formulation. Again, the question of 
bureaucratic legitimacy surfaces with the exclusion of participatory governing structures. 
Post modernism views the organization as a method of exerting control over the 
individual. The social construction of individualism is merely a method of exerting control 
through culture. For example, while the disintegrated management structures prevalent in 
high tech firms seem to allow individuals autonomy in achieving rewards and recognition, in 
reality the firm, organizational structure, controls of what the rewards will consist, how 
much of the rewards are to be shared, and who ultimately receives those rewards. 
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Foucault's concept of power regime's is constructed to address these issues as a 
matter of relational processes. Modern thought conceives of the individual as separate from 
society. The differentiation of the personal self from the public self is a method through 
which individualization becomes palatable in the face of the reality of human 
interdependence. However, postmodernism insists that there cannot be differentiation 
between a public and a private self. Instead, all selves are social constructed by means of a 
subjective reality as part of a scheme to exert hegemony through the creation of a false 
individualism. 
Feldman's (1999) critique of postmodern organizational theory revolves around 
postmodernism's conceptualization of the coterminous relationship of power and 
knowledge. The daily tension between thought and action reflects the conflict between 
knowledge and power. If power and knowledge are to be considered coterminous, the 
implementation of knowledge would necessarily exactly reflect its meaning. This is not the 
case. Knowledge of an external object is dependent upon internal awareness. The collapse 
of politics into culture implicitly adopts the Marxist belief that concepts could be 
implemented as conceived. This indirect relation to Marx causes postmodern philosophy to 
be an unwitting heir to the modem rationalism which it seeks to reject. 
According to Hom (1995) legislatures are apt to produce vague legislation in order 
to delegate decision-making authority to administrative organizations. His approach derives 
of rational-choice theory, whereby individuals make rational choices given their level of 
information. Hom draws comparisons between organizational structures in state owned 
enterprises (those organizations that 'sell' services and are thereby not reliant upon tax 
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receipts) and private sector organizations including similar decision-making structures, levels 
of organizational stability, and levels of accountability. 
Moreover, he admonishes legislators from protecting appointments with 
classification under civil service. The backlash is the removal of positions from classification 
(Hom, 1995, p.106). Still, Rockman (Farazmand, 1997) asserts that civil service systems are 
founded on principles that are antithetical to market competitiveness, that of legal authority. 
That legislatures rely upon the civil-service bureaucracy to constrain executive discretion and 
curtail appointment of political supporters, is as much a mechanism of organizational 
control as it is an attempt to promote a positivist system of governance. However, given the 
primacy of bureaucratic systems the legislature in turn is constrained by the power of 
organizational decision-making structures. In other words, the insular nature of the merit 
system makes the bureaucracy a powerful player in formulating policy as well as 
administering legislation. Accountability and efficiency are of necessity, according to Horn, 
built into the system. Hence, for the public management faction, the function of 
accountability is inherent within the established systemic separation of powers. Public 
management, as well as similar administrative movements, seeks to re-invent the status quo 
by retaining the positivist influences of the past, including the exclusion of truly democratic 
processes from the administrative realm. 
The Paradox of Liberal Democracy 
That positivist ideology still dominates American governance is by no means a 
revelation. The founding fathers of American constitutionalism were steeped in the 
contemporary philosophical movements of their day. Immanuel Kant's political theory 
establishes the basis for much of what American's consider to be the essential principles 
necessary to a functioning constitutional form of government. The virtues that Kant extols 
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in his political philosophy are an outgrowth of the Enlightenment and the belief in the 
perfectibility of social institutions through scientific advancement. Kant's political theory is 
comprised of four basic values (Sullivan, 1994): individualism-asserts the moral primacy of 
the individual against the claims of societal collectivl.ty; egalitarianism-all individuals share 
the same moral status; universalism-affirms the moral unity of human-kind, and allows 
only a secondary significance to cultural forms and historic associations; meliorism-
establishes the improvability of social and political institutions. 
Kant, like Thomas Hobbes, rationalized the need for government by envisioning an 
aboriginal state of nature. The state, in Kant's political theory, is an outgrowth of armed 
conflict, seen as the need to protect lives and property. Government is a social contract 
necessary to constrain, otherwise, uncontrollable individual desires. For Kant, the state is 
regarded as a negative power, requisite to curb both individuals' transgressions against one 
another as well as a proscription on tyranny. 
Kant's political philosophy resolves that the state's legitimacy comes not from the 
exertion of power, but on the rule of law. Kant regards the legal system as the ultimate 
authority for the state. It is Kant's universal principle of justice that forms the basis for a 
moral code with which every individual must abide. Yet, the universal principle of justice 
also provides for individual autonomy and individual dignity as moral authority against the 
unchecked power of the state. Consequently, the universal principle of justice forms both a 
legal and social bond that compels the state to safeguard individual liberties, and protects 
citizens from the state's absolute authority. 
To a large degree Locke and Mill form the basis of liberal democratic support for 
American constitutionalism. John Stuart Mill, especially, extols the virtues of utilitarianism, a 
philosophy derived of individual self-interest. For Mill it is imperative that individuals self-
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develop and almost any state intrusion into the process of self-discovery is detrimental to 
both the individual and the state alike 0f alls, 1999). Philosophically, utilitarianism only 
consents to an infringement of personal rights whereupon the individual's liberties openly 
clash with those of another. Interestingly, Mill sees the state as an extension of society, 
generally regarded as a collection of individuals, and thus he considers political participation 
as essential to individual self-development. In addition, Mill does not draw a distinction 
between positive and negative rights and therefore does not utterly exclude government 
action, but on the whole Mill holds that laissez-faire is the preferred way to govern. 
Likewise, John Locke advocates liberal democratic principles that emphasize the 
state of nature so as to properly ameliorate the inherent difficulties of human receptiveness 
to law, and hence governance (Myers, 1999). Moreover, Locke's rationalism is based on an 
acquired understanding of human nature. Most importantly, for Locke the explanation of 
individual agency and the rational pursuit of happiness stems from a foundation in natural 
science and, subsequently, an ability to recognize the human condition. 
One of the paradoxes of a constitutional system of governance based upon the 
philosophical foundations of Mill and Locke becomes how to preserve individual self-
interest while providing social goods, or collective action. The dichotomy of the individual 
versus the collective is a byproduct of the liberal democratic principles that stress self-
interest. Locke goes to some length to unsuccessfully resolve the quandary. Locke asserts 
the premise of the king's prerogative, executive power in modem parlance (Pasquino, 1998). 
The executive function for Locke is not merely to administer the law, but has a distinct and 
emphatic responsibility to remain independent and adaptable in order to better face 
adversity. But, what of executive accountability? Locke viewed human virtue as a deterrent 
to vice. Rationalism in human kind would overcome malevolence. Failing human virtue, 
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however, Locke looked to the legislative function for oversight in order to curb executive 
excess. Therefore, Locke is often viewed as the consummate proponent of the separation of 
powers within government. 
However, for Locke legality is not merely reducible to political legitimacy. 
Therefore, executive discretion is not immutable and can be opposed. Rather, Locke 
preferred to rely upon natural law as a foundation for political legitimacy. Constitutional 
organization relies upon the state of nature, and government must act, first and foremost, to 
preserve property. Locke was also concerned with the tyranny of the majority. A topic that, 
for the framers, came to dominate constitutional discourse. Locke's defense of freedom is 
bound up in a devotion to natural equality. While according to Locke, maximizing individual 
welfare results in maximizing overall welfare, nevertheless it is an apparent contradiction in 
both terms and deeds to suppose that general welfare can be tied to individual materialism, 
particularly when the implications of private ownership must often be addressed collectively 
(Kramer, 1998). 
Technical Rationality and the Continuing Crisis in Public Service 
The recent past has witnessed an erosion of public faith in the ability of government 
to provide appropriate, cost-effective, and efficient services (Berman, 1997). Peters (1999) 
cites decreases of citizen confidence in both the overall administrative system as well as the 
integrity of government officials. The failure of public administration can be characterized 
as the failure of the bureaucracy to retain public trust in the face of conditions adverse to the 
preservation of democratic processes. The conditions that inevitably lead to the erosion of 
public trust begin with incompetent public officials who abdicate their responsibility to make 
efficacious policy and allow administrative agencies far too much discretion in formulating, 
not administering, policy. 
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Or, as Caiden outlines Qabbra and Dwivedi, 1989), politicos are too preoccupied 
with re-election concerns to root out administrative incompetence and malfeasance. Second, 
corrupt public servants, although present in far fewer numbers than would-be reformers 
would lead the public to believe, continue to weaken faith in the administrative system. 
Third, bureaucratic systems continue to promote an anti-democratic ethos. Disdain and 
outright hostility on the part of administrators towards the public attacks the very nature of 
public sovereignty. Fourth, bureaucratic inertia defeats attempts to restore democratic 
processes to administrative systems. The present hierarchical system of civil service and 
classification perpetuates an inability to reform bureaucratic systems. Finally, anonymity 
stymies bureaucratic reform. The anonymous bureaucrat follows rigid administrative rules 
or orders that emanate from somewhere within the hierarchy, while responsibility and 
accountability can be difficult to affix. 
Indeed, legitimating administrative action has been a continuing source of frustration 
for citizens of liberal democratic states. Reconciling democratic processes with 
administrative activities, that often lack sufficient mechanisms to provide democratic 
representation and administrative accountability, is difficult at best. At worst, administrative 
activity can result in the execution of horrific acts committed by ordinary people during 
periods of moral inversion, e.g. the German civil service administering the pogrom that 
became the holocaust. 
Positivism, in the guise of technical rationality, persists as the source of the malaise in 
American liberal democracy. For example, technical rationality tends to drive out 
considerations of ethics in administrative settings (Adams and Balfour, 1998). Consider that 
technical rationality seeks to promote "value neutrality" as a means of shielding apparent 
objectivity in administrative decision-making. Even the use of euphemism and technical 
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language, couched in terms of applied "expertise," is a method of excluding those outside the 
organization. Moreover, the use of language in organizations allows for dehumanization, 
and provides emotional distance from administrative actions (Adams and Balfour, 1998). In 
expressing the justification for the Final Solution to the "Jewish problem," Nazi Germany 
relied upon medical metaphors, e.g. blight, plague, infestation, etc., to qualify the 
extermination of millions people considered an undesirable, or surplus population. Similar 
terms are yet employed to describe today's slums. 
Technical rationality, as symbolic of positivist philosophy, denies history, culture, and 
context in representing social phenomenon. Social problems cannot be resolved through 
scientific means. Unfortunately, government's continued reliance upon rigorous scientific 
research echoes the continued dependence of contemporary organizations upon positivist 
rationales rather than adopting an historical and cultural examination and reassessment of 
public sector organizations. Currently, modem organizations rely upon statistics and 
research-based expertise to manufacture, or contract, "data" in order to account for 
programmatic success or failure. That modern governance clings to a foundation in the 
social sciences while simultaneously encouraging greater applicability of the "hard sciences" 
is telling. Under modem, positivist philosophy science legitimizes itself even as the data it 
produces legitimizes organizational purpose. Administrative organizations rely upon 
expertise and a culture of professionalism to gamer legitimacy in order to perform highly 
specialized functions. 
Still, bureaucratic legitimacy is a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, technical-
rationality provides a measure of professional, or practical, legitimacy. On the other hand, 
legal, or moral, legitimacy must emanate from constitutional or statutory law, or the very 
sovereignty of the state. Since the inception of American constitutional government, the 
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constant tension latent in the doctrine of separation of powers, generally manifested through 
litigation, has profoundly shaped governance. Often day-to-day governance resorts to little 
more than the blurring of the already abstruse lines drawn by the doctrine of separation of 
powers, i.e. a judiciary that legislates, a legislature that meddles in administration. 
Legal legitimacy is a significant constraint upon organizational disintegration, the 
dissolution of rigid hierarchy, and increased administrative discretion. It is the basic 
structure of American government, enshrined in a series of legislative acts (e.g. 
Administrative Procedures Act, §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, etc.), that retards the 
effort toward reorganization (Peters and Savoie, 1996). Moreover, the enforcement of legal 
constraints on pubic sector organizations generally comes from legal claims made by private 
citizens through a judiciary that insists on a 'rational basis' for administrative action. 
Representation and Public Sector Organizations 
Interestingly, Ryden (1996) imparts to the Supreme Court the responsibility of 
establishing the operative framework of the American representational model. Traditionally, 
the Supreme Court has strenuously defended individual voting rights over nearly all other 
considerations in Congressional redistricting. Literally, the Court is inclined to support only 
the concept of one person, one equal vote. Accordingly, elections have long been viewed as 
aggregates of votes cast by individuals, to the exclusion of recognition of groups as possible 
representative mechanisms for clarifying or enhancing individual participation. 
The Court has tended to discourage any institution from mediating between 
individuals and elected representatives. Again, the liberal tradition predominates the both 
the cultural and political landscapes. The Court has been predisposed to favor undirected, 
personal political activity, and principles of fair and effective representation displaced the 
concept of representation based on voting efficacy. More importantly, reliance upon the 
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primacy of individualism ignores the pluralist nature of modem policy making, wherebywell-
organized interest groups compete for the attention of elected officials in formulating public 
policy. 
Representation, too, is paradoxical, at once serving the general welfare while 
simultaneously defending individual interests. According to Rosenbloom (1983) 
administrative theory should include three distinct approaches: managerial, political, and 
legal. Again, the primacy of legitimating administrative action is considered indispensable to 
any suitable administrative theory. In order to increase citizen participation within the 
positivist bureaucratic system Kirlin (1996) adopts four criteria that administrative systems 
must satisfy: 1. achieving a democratic polity; 2. adopting the lofty values, or value-based 
processes, that are essential to a democratic society over the preeminence of singular 
organizational cultures; 3. confronting the complexity of instruments of collective action; 
and 4. encouraging effective societal learning. 
First, Kirlin finds fault in the tendency of administrative theory to concentrate 
exclusively on either the study of organizational systems or the policy-making process. It is 
his contention that administrative theory emerge from the analysis of both bureaucracy and 
especially polity. An efficient administrative agency is anathema if it is also in detriment to 
advancing the democratic process. Second, Kirlin seeks the preservation of democratic 
values including a political system that: can produce and effect collective choices, increase 
citizenship and political leadership, and ensure a limited government that allows for 
collective action without the intervention of public authority while simultaneously protecting 
individual liberties. Third, administration is an absolute necessity to the smooth operation of 
society and the conducting modem life , yet the complexity of social institutions too often 
blurs the line between the individual and the collective. Regulations, public-private 
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partnerships, as well as firms and associations operate according to an established 
framework. That framework can be influenced by those under its charge. The intricate 
systems and processes that organically stem from the policy-making process can be 
simplified so as to allow for increased citizen participation, e.g. referenda. Lastly, societal 
learning is imperative to achieving the desired results in the other three criteria and thus 
increasing citizen participation in governance. Kirlin cautions that scientific knowledge 
should not be considered a legitimating instrument of the policy process. Rather, societal 
values and customs, market considerations, the mass media, and public opinion can be 
regarded as paramount to quelling conflicting perspectives. 
Once again, both praxis and theory would do well to eschew public management 
over consideration of public administration. Public administration theorists continue to 
attempt to resolve the age-old politics-administration dichotomy. In this vein, Kirlin (1996) 
develops the four criteria into the seven "big questions" that emanate from an analysis of 
administrative theory: 
1. What are the instruments of collective action that remain responsible both to 
democratically elected officials and to core societal values? 
2. What are the roles of non-governmental forms of collective action in society, an 
how can desired roles be protected and nurtured 
3. What are the appropriate tradeoffs between governmental structures based on 
function (facilitating organizational tasks) and geography (facilitating citizenship, 
political considerations, and societal learning). 
4. How shall tensions between national and local political arenas be resolved? 
5. What decisions shall be "isolated" from the normal processes of politics so that 
some other rationale can be applied? 
6. What balance shall be struck among neutral competence, representativeness, and 
leadership? 
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7. How can processes of societal learning be improved, including knowledge of 
choices available, of consequences of alternatives, and of how to achieve desired 
goals, most importantly the nurturing and development of a democratic polity? 
Bardach (1998; p. 13) refers to the pluralism problem, " ... governmental organization 
at any given moment is to some important extent an expression of the theory relied upon by 
some previous coalition of legislative victors attempting to embody its victory in institutions 
that will survive possible reversals of fortune .... " 
The fragmentation of society is an established postmodern phenomenon. How well 
a representative democracy deals with such fragmentation is crucial to insuring that collective 
outcomes for mutual benefit can be achieved. "Views will often diverge sharply on who or 
what is at fault and what should be done to fix the problem. There is no universal 
agreement on what counts as 'problem' and what as 'solution', or when the point is reached 
where the 'solution' becomes worse than the 'problem"' (Hood, 1998; pp. 24-5). Hood 
espouses a cultural theory framework to approach problem solving. Cultural theory 
proposes to 'capture' the variety of historical debates surrounding public administration by 
incorporating extant knowledge of organizational structures into a coherent whole. While 
the historical approach of cultural theory may be instructive as to why certain structural 
choices are made, the theory fails to impart what works in the context of praxis. Such is 
often the schism between theory and practice. Consequently, both praxis and theory suffer 
as a result of the rift in the study of administration between analysis of policy and 
administration. 
Theory and Praxis: Melding Thought and Action 
The fully positivist assumptions underlying the study of administration, specifically: 
the rationality of human activity; the absolute nature of organizations; the ability to achieve 
consensus around organizational goals; and the permanence of the key tenets that shape 
administrative theory, inexorably lead to the ensuing crisis in administrative theory. 
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Predictably, the study of administration has long suffered from a major schism 
between the theorist and the practitioner. Generally, theorists are chided for indulging in 
seemingly untethered philosophical dalliances. This ontological rift stems from the vastly 
different operational and ideological approaches of the two conflicting factions. In essence 
the debate has been, should theory steer practice or does practice guide theory? 
Regrettably, the contest between practitioner and theorist has very real implications 
for both the study of administration and policy-formulation in governance. Practitioners 
continue to cling to the theoretical positivist foundation of the existence of a singular, 
objective truth and a system of one-dimensional rationalism, whether or not this untenable 
framework is sustained in practice. Theorists struggle to secure reformation of organizations 
borne of a liberal democratic political system that operates within an established capitalist, 
market-driven structure. 
Whether in the guise of constitutionalism, the new public management, 
communitarianism, or postmodern administration praxis relies upon theoretical framework 
to establish parameters for administrative action. The theoretical groundwork for 
administrative practitioners is rooted in the reality that most organizations continue to rely 
upon a hierarchical structure with which to act. 
Osborne and Pastrik (1997) attempt to bridge the chasm between administrative 
thought and action and simultaneously span the void between positivist and postmodernist 
administration. While not a repudiation of prior work that set about reinventing 
government by incorporating market systems into the administrative process, the acceptance 
of many of the principles of critical theory allows an adaptive perspective in administrative 
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practice. The inclusion of politics into administrative practice allows for the diminution of 
the relevance of the politics-administration dichotomy. Osborne and Pastrik (1997) identify 
five "levers" that act as the "DNA" of an organization: purpose; incentives; accountability; 
power; and culture. These levers must be fundamentally altered for an organization to 
undergo reinvention. Five strategies serve to facilitate organizational changes. First, the 
core strategy entails clarification of organizational purpose. The consequences strategy 
involves active management in order to create consequences, or outcomes, that support 
organizational change. The customer strategy philosophically occasions achieving customer 
satisfaction. Meanwhile, the control strategy acts to empower organizational members, the 
community at large, and the organization itself. Finally, the culture strategy aims to alter 
organizational culture so as to break with organizational history and engage in new thought 
processes. 
The five strategies for reinvention are all qualified with a recommendation for the 
application of, principally, postmodern principles. Primarily, Osborne and Pastrik. encourage 
the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in the reform process. Inclusion is founded upon 
heightened communications among the participating parties. Collaboration is central to 
successful reform efforts, and clearly, collaboration cannot occur without forthright 
commurucat1on. 
In order to properly contrast the traditional, rational organizational system with a 
post-modem, hybrid methodology the essay presents two case studies. The context for each 
case study is a single agency, the US Environmental Protection Agency, establishing 
environmental regulations and subsequent enforcement measures. In one case, the agency 
relies upon traditional, rational measures to coerce enforcement. Whereas, in another case 
the agency adopts a collaborative posture through a flexbible interpretation of regulations. 
SECTION THREE-ATLANTIC STEEL: THE NEW, HYBRID E.P.A. 
The Case of the Atlantic Steel Project: The Premise and Legal Background 
In conjunction with Jacoby Development, an international real estate developer 
renowned for large scale retail projects, the City of Atlanta, Georgia generated plans to 
remediate and redevelop an existing brownfield site located West of down town Atlanta. 
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The Atlantic Steel site is a tum of the century steel mill that is to be redeveloped according 
to the principles of "new urbanism," involving mixed land-use. Mixed-use development 
encourages complimentary uses, such as residential and light retail/ commercial, to coexist. 
These land-use principles are based on the concepts of the older urban neighborhood, that 
often had grocers, bakers, theatres, hardware merchants, etc., nestled into residential areas. 
Residents of these neighborhoods could walk to local merchants and purchase necessary 
accoutrements. New urbanism flies in the face of the prevalent, traditional Euclidean zoning 
schemes that pyramid and segregate land-uses, e.g. single family residential, low density 
multi-family, high density multi-family, light commercial, heavy manufacturing, etc .. 
The 138-acre Atlantic Steel site has been isolated from down town Atlanta by two 
interstate highways. In order to re-connect the Atlantic Steel site to the balance of the city, 
the development plans call for the proposed building of a multi-modal, e.g. shared 
pedestrian, light rail, and vehicular, span across both highways. The construction of the 
proposed span necessitates the infusion of federal highway monies. However, 
environmental organizations have publicly threatened to file suit in federal court to enjoin 
the EPA from releasing federal monies to build the inter-modal span in Atlanta. 
The Clean Air Act requires all states to have implementation plans for achieving 
explicit clean air standards, 42 USC§ 74 lO(a) (1999). Failure to achieve the compliance 
standards set by each state in its implementation plan for the EPA is a violation of the Clean 
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Air Act and is categorized as "non-attainment," 42 USC§ 7501 (1999). Sanctions imposed 
upon states that are characterized as non-attainment regions, 42 USC§ 7509(b) (1999), 
include curtailing federal highway funds as defined under 23 USC§ 135 (1999). According 
to the EPA's own regulations a transportation project that does not meet clean air 
implementation plans does not qualify for federal highway funds, 40 CFR § 93.100. 
Therefore, in keeping with the strict letter of the law, the EPA is obliged to prevent the 
disbursement of federal highway funds for the construction of the multi-modal span across 
the two interstate highways. 
However, under the Project XL criteria for innovative environmental enforcement 
procedures the EPA has the discretion to release federal funds for the construction of a 
multi-modal span at the Atlantic Steel site. Project XL is an experimental executive program 
implemented by the EPA to apply innovative collaborative techniques, e.g. self-auditing, to 
regulatory enforcement. When viewed under Project XL's flexible standards, exceptions to 
strict enforcement of the dean Air Act can be instituted when the project is considered a 
transportation control measure, integral to public transportation, or a modification to the 
highway system to accommodate other modes of transportation, 23 USC§§ 104, 142 (1999). 
Reinventing Government: Creation of an Hybrid Organizational Framework? 
Project XL, along with the EPA' s recent shift in regulatory policy towards 
environmental self-auditing, may be considered an expression of adaptive, hybrid 
organizational structures. Under the aegis of the Clinton-Gore administration, the initiative 
to "reinvent" government mandates federal agencies, through executive order, to submit 
plans so as to implement improved and effective customer service strategies. The National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPRG), formerly the National Performance 
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Review, was created by the Clinton-Gore administration in order to trim federal budgets as 
well as to increase agency productivity and responsiveness. 
Through executive order 12862, 11 September 1993, Clinton ordered that all federal 
agencies set measurable customer service standards and develop performance evaluation 
criteria with which to gauge the achievement of those standards. Furthermore, each federal 
agency was to produce and institute a customer service plan by 8 September 1994 that was 
to include the crafting of customer surveys and the establishment of benchmarks for all 
agency programs. The "reinvention of government" has been touted as efficient, achieving 
cost-savings and the easing of bureaucratic red-tape, and effective, by restoring the emphasis 
of government programs upon the citizens and constituents those programs were designed 
to serve. Recent, NPRG goals include achievement of customer service standards 
corresponding to those of private industry as well as the establishment of electronic access 
for information on nearly all government programs and realizing full electronic transactional 
capabilities. 
Project XL: An Expression of Hybrid Organizational Systems 
Project XL, short for eXcellence and Leadership [sic], is an Environmental 
Protection Agency federal pilot program that emanated from the EP A's Reinvention Action 
Council. The stated goals of Project XL (EPA website, 2000) are to: 
• produce superior environmental results beyond those that would have been achieved under 
current and reasonably anticipated future regulations or policies; 
• produce benefits such as cost savings, paperwork reduction, regulatory flexibility or other 
types of flexibility that serve as an incentive to both project sponsors and regulators; 
• supported by stakeholders; 
• achieve innovation/ pollution prevention; 
• produce lessons or data that are transferable to other facilities; 
• demonstrate feasibility; 
• establish accountability through agreed upon methods of monitoring, reporting, and 
evaluations; and 
• avoid shifting the risk burden, i.e., do not create worker safety or environmental justice 
problems as a result of the experiment 
If the applicants to Project XL are a community, the experiment should 
• present economic opportunity; and 
• incorporate community planning 
While Project XL was conceived, largely, to reduce the onerous quality of 
bureaucratic government, the program has adopted both the posture and methods of 
postmodern administration. First, Project XL demonstration projects originate from the 
effected parties and not from the EPA. The central power of the EPA is not a coercive 
force requiring regulatory submission. Rather, EPA adopts a collaborative framework 
instead of the standard hierarchical intransigence. 
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Second, programs that fall under Project XL guidelines are to have broad stakeholder 
appeal. Involving stakeholders promotes cooperative attitudes among interested parties and 
encourages participants to be vested in the success of the project. Opportunities for public 
involvement are extended beyond the customary comment period or public hearing. The 
EPA views Project XL as a partnership among the federal, state, and local government as 
well as the local community and business interests. 
Last, Project XL relies on the provision of universal information. The agency's 
increased emphasis upon communication, and communicative structures, is facilitated by 
exploiting electronic media. Moreover, the heightened reliance upon more sophisticated 
forms of communication translates into the development of multimedia permitting systems, 
and the exploration of cross organizational cooperative structures. 
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The EP A's stricture for Project XL experiments comes, in the main, as a directive 
that in order to qualify for Project XL, submitted projects furnish increased evaluative 
criteria and appropriate empirical data. Initially, prospective Project XL programs are 
required to demonstrate greater efficiencies and cost-savings. Later, Project XL programs 
are to illustrate continued synergies resulting from the EPA's allowance of flexible 
enforcement strategies. By all appearances, the EPA cannot has chosen not to abandon its 
techno-rational roots. However, in the case of Atlantic Steel, the EPA seems to have 
embraced the creative, and more relaxed, interpretation of standards of efficiency. It is 
exactly such a qualitative interpretation of the Clean Air Act even in the face of 
congressionally mandated enforcement that deviates from the agency's traditional, positivist 
scientific systems. 
Agency Discretion vs. Legal Mandate: The Burden of Positivism 
Court challenges to the release of federal highway funds may well come in light of 
the Atlanta region's non-attainment status, while the EPA's rationale behind the affirmation 
of the Atlantic Steel multi-modal bridge project, falls under the rubric of flexible Project XL 
standards. The agency's assertion that the entire Atlantic Steel project be viewed as a traffic 
control measure (given the site's proximity to down town Atlanta) along with the subsequent 
improvement in regional air quality that should accompany the project's reliance upon public 
and alternate forms of transportation, seems to be of a sufficient substantial interest to pass 
constitutional muster. In order to prove a substantial government interest, the EPA must 
rely upon a veneer of positivism, by clearly illustrating that the guidelines set by the Clean 
Air Act will be met through alternative means. Yet, the EPA is relying on postmodern 
principles of accepting alternate means, by collaborating with polluters who violate EPA's 
own "scientific" standards for air quality, of achieving the goal of clean air. 
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However, the EPA could face legal challenges to its exercise of administrative 
discretion and legal authority. For example, inActi.onfor Rational Transitv. West Side Higfawzy 
Projcrt, 699 F.2d 614 (2"d Cir. 1982) the Court acknowledged, and upheld, the EPA's 
contention that New York State and the City of New York had alternative methods of 
financing public transit which allowed the EPA to use its discretionary powers to release 
federal highway funds for Westway construction. The case revolved around the issue of 
whether the EPA was obliged to prevent the disbursement of highway funds for a non-
attainment region under 42 USC§ 7509(b) (1999). Agency discretion may simultaneously 
be the EPA's best ally and worst detriment in approving federal highway funds for the 
Atlantic Steel span. 
As far as EPA's decision to pursue the Atlantic Steel multi-modal bridge project 
under the aegis of the XL Project, the most serious challenge could issue from the 
Constitutional requirements of separation of powers (Hirsch, 1998). For instance, in Chevron 
USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984), 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, the 
Supreme Court unequivocally stated that an agency must follow its congressional mandate. 
The legislative powers, "herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States," 
US Const. Art. I, 1. And, the President, and the administrative agencies under his charge, 
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." US Const. Art. II, 3. Furthermore, 
Hirsch (1998) contends that a challenger must take up the admonishment of the Chevron 
Court and establish that the agency's actions were arbitrary and capricious. 
The extant enabling legislation affirms that citizens have a right to sue EPA for non-
enforcement of air quality standards, 42 USC§ 7604(a) (1999). In Citizens far a Better 
Erroirunmentv. Cosde, 610 F. Supp. 106, 15 ELR 20793 (ND ID. 1985), the Court ruled that the 
EPA had failed to perform its non-discretionary duty by not following the agency's explicit 
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congressional mandate to insure air quality standards and thereby could be compelled to do 
so by the District Court, "any person may commence a civil action ... against the 
Administrator [of the EPA] where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform 
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator ... The 
district courts shall have jurisdiction [to] order the Administrator to perform such act or 
duty," 42 USC§ 7604(a) (1999). Furthermore, the Citizens Court ruled that judicial review of 
the Administrator's actions in promulgating rules and regulations, including state 
implementation plans, was to proceed in the appropriate Circuit Court, 42 USC§ 7607(b) 
(1999). However, the standard to be applied in judicial review of discretionary action 
remains that of arbitrary and capricious, 42 USC§ 7607(d). Therefore, environmental 
organizations have successfully sued to force the EP A 's enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 
42 USC§ 7401 et seq. (1999), providing the organization has legal standing and the court 
finds ripeness of the suit. 
In Councilof0mmuter0rganiz£ltionsv. Gorsud-J, 683 F.2d 648 (2nd Cir. 1982), the Circuit 
Court ruled impermissible the EPA's order to lift the moratorium on major new 
construction projects that would significantly increase air pollution. Highway construction is 
recognized by the Congress as a construction project that increases air pollution and as such 
subject to the construction moratorium, 42 USC§ 7410(a)(2)(1) (1999). An environmental 
organization may successfully argue that the developer, the City of Atlanta, and the State of 
Georgia did not provide EPA sufficient proof that the Atlantic Steel project would not 
increase vehicular traffic in the metropolitan region. 
Whether an environmental organization can raise a legal challenge as to the EP A's 
discretionary action in the case of Atlantic Steel revolves around the reasonableness of the 
justification for approving the multi-modal span. The concept that inner-city redevelopment 
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reduces vehicle trips is sound enough. Yet, the marketing behind the Atlantic Steel site as an 
amusement destination, e.g. night clubs, shopping, cinema, etc., tends to controvert the 
argument that the project, on the whole, should be considered a traffic control measure. 
The Atlantic Steel bridge could be targeted by environmental groups as falling under a pre-
existing construction moratorium. Recently, Georgia has lost its battle to federally fund a 
multitude of transportation projects as a non-attainment region, Environmmtal Defense Fund v. 
EPA, 167F.3d641 (DCCir.1999). TheCourt'sdecisioninEDFv. EPA was based on the 
finding that transportation planning and air quality management should proceed hand-in-
hand. The Court saw EPA regulations that permit local approval of federally funded 
transportation projects, 40 CFR §93.121(a)(l), to be a clear violation of Clean Air Act 
requirements for broader, more comprehensive regional approval in the form of a currently 
conforming transportation plan and a clean air implementation plan, 42 USC§ 7506(c)(4) 
(1999). 
More importantly, a recent challenge to EPA's discretion in setting national air 
quality standards was upheld by the court once the EPA could not rationalize the thresholds 
that the agency had set for allowable ozone and particulate matter levels, American Trucking 
Associationsv. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (DC Cir. 1999). In the American Trucking case the Court 
established that the Congress had stripped the EPA of the wide discretion of deciding which 
non-attainment areas should qualify for more time in reaching attainment, and therefore the 
American Trucking Court's decision specifies that national, universal air quality standards are 
simply beyond the realm of EPA discretion. Moreover, the American Trucking Court goes to 
great lengths to assert that the EPA could not quantify a standard for "adverse effects" of 
pollutants. The American Trucking Court has reintroduced the nondelegation doctrine 
(Sunstein, 1999). The issue of whether a tightening of environmental standards has a 
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sufficient enough environmental reward to warrant applicable sanctions, as in the Ammarn 
Trucking case, has ramifications for a broad range of discretionary administrative decisions 
vis-a-vis what constitutes arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the regulating agency. 
Sunstein (1999) reiterates the importance of bounding agency discretion with floors and 
ceilings, and encourages the acceptance of the nondelegation doctrine in cases that involve 
open-ended grants of authority. 
The American Trucking case bodes well for possible legal challenges to the EPA's use 
of wide discretionary maneuvers along the lines of the XL Project designation of Atlantic 
Steel multi-modal span. A court challenge need only prove that EP A's actions were arbitrary 
and capricious based on the lack of quantifiable data. 
Since the Project XL initiative is a creature of the executive branch a court may very 
well look askance at the EP A's use of such a wide berth in the exercise of agency discretion 
in enforcement of Clean Air standards, and rule the use of federal funds for the project as 
arbitrary and capricious. When agency discretion is viewed through the lens of the Ammarn 
Trucking decision and the re-establishment of the nondelegation doctrine in administrative 
decision-making, the EP A's decision to release federal monies for the construction of the 
Atlantic Steel bridge may be called into question by a court. 
Nevertheless, the EPA position is buttressed by the decision of the Court in the 
Action far Rational, Transit case that took a much more favorable view of agency discretion in 
not strictly enforcing Clean Air standards. Since the courts are proscribing agency discretion 
in the promulgation of rules and regulations, the legal challenge over the Atlantic Steel span 
poses an interesting constitutional question as to the power of the executive branch to 
interpret congressional mandates. There is no facile prediction for the outcome of the 
Atlantic Steel case. 
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Environmental organizations have of late, successfully pursued court challenges to 
EPA discretion in enforcement of Clean Air standards in the Erroi:runmmtal Defense Fund case. 
Yet another court has recently found EPA exceeded its allowable discretion in the A mm.am 
T rucki:ng case. The EPA would do well to produce instances whereupon it has successfully 
applied Project XL, especially as applicable to air quality. And, the agency could generate 
traffic studies that support its insistence that the Atlantic Steel project will reduce vehicular 
traffic, and consequently emissions. A court will likely be swayed by such substantial 
evidence that Atlantic Steel redevelopment is a traffic control measure. Such "empirical" 
measures are sufficient to allay the judiciary's fear of agency subjectivism and thereby meet 
the established bounds of "scientific" data. Inevitably the all too subjective standards that 
government regularly applies must, at the very least, appear to have the semblance of 
empiricism upon them. U1timately, the constitutional questions as to the separation of 
powers can only be settled by the courts. 
SECTION FOUR-C.E.R.C.LA.: THE FAILURE OF POSITIVISM 
Superfund: The EPA's Positivist Failure 
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Conversely, some EPA programs that have relied heavily on prototypical positivist 
data collection, analysis, and interpretation have been assailed as both inefficient and 
ineffectual. Despite the EPA reliance on "empirical" data, the reality of operating in a 
postmodern world-politics, fiscal constraints, public opinion-has served to subvert the 
establishment of enforcement standards, program goals, and implementation strategies. The 
Superfund program is, perhaps, the single largest example of the inability of the 
environmental agency to rationalize a program in order to achieve a universally popular 
public policy objective. 
Hazardous wastes are unpleasant remnants of the Industrial Age. Sites contaminated 
by industrial pollutants and subsequently abandoned are colloquially known as brownfields. 
Since the notoriety of Love Canal in 1978 and the corresponding federal response in 1980, 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA)-better known as the "Superfund" statute, environmental legislation and policy 
implementation has been mired in legal and political wrangling. The CERCLA statute was 
administered by the EPA. In the Superfund the federal government sought to create 
legislation that would allow: the coordinated cleanup of extant hazard waste sites; the ability 
to affix financial liability for toxic dumping; and attempt to prevent the wide-spread practice 
of dumping such wastes. Unfortunately, the Superfund has to a large extent thwarted the 
remediation and redevelopment of brownfields due in large part to the unintended 
implications of Superfund policy and EP A's intransigence on remediation standards (Revesz 
and Stewart, 1995; Davis, 1993; Barnett, 1994, Soesilo and Wilson, 1997). 
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The Superfund debate largely swirls about the issue of strict liability. No fault or 
negligence on the part of the potentially responsible party (EPA's terminology) need be 
demonstrated for liability to be assessed. In legal parlance this is known as strict liability. 
Also, liability is considered retroactive. In other words, wastes deposited prior to CERCLA 
enactment can form the basis for liability of remediation taken after enactment. Finally, 
liability is joint and several. Unless a defendant can illustrate "divisibility" any potentially 
responsible party can be singled out to bear the entire cost of remediation. Superfund 
liability includes current and past owners of the site, as well as transporters and producers of 
the waste--liability is assessed irrespective of role. 
Critics of the Superfund program point to liability as a major deterrent to the 
purchase, financing, and remediation of brownfield sites to allow for redevelopment. 
Purchasers of real estate face the threat of buying potentially contaminated land and the 
subsequent liability claims (Revesz and Stewart, 1995). In order to properly claim the 
"innocent land owner" defense to avoid liability the potentially responsible party must 
establish that, at the time of purchase, the buyer did not know and had no reason to know 
about hazardous substances on site. Such a defense requires the purchaser to undertake 
extensive, and expensive, environmental assessments prior to purchase. Such expenses are 
rarely undertaken when development costs are already prohibitively high or on sites that may 
only yield marginal, it any, returns. As an extension to the constraints leveled by 
enforcement of strict liability standards, lending institutions could be exempt from liability 
when they do not participate in the management of a site or hold indicia ownership to 
protect a security interest. Nonetheless, the courts have been divided on the interpretation 
of this aspect of Superfund legislation (Revesz and Stewart, 1995). Therefore, lending 
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institutions are loathe to finance projects that involve convoluted legal issues and possibly a 
de facto liability claim. 
Additionally, the insurance industry has been directly affected by Superfund policies. 
From 1973-86 the standard comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies included a 
pollution exclusion clause, that held insurance would only provide coverage to bodily injury 
and property damage claims in the event of "sudden and accidental" discharge of pollutants. 
In large part as a result of Superfund, insurers amended the clause to explicitly exclude all 
pollution-related liability (Revesz and Stewart, 1995). Moreover, Superfund has initiated 
enormous litigation vis-a-vis the liability of insurers under pre-1986 policies. 
Finally, municipalities have been inordinately burdened by Superfund. Since many 
municipal waste facilities contain hazardous wastes, the cleanup costs are enormous. 
deanup costs are apportioned by two relevant criteria. First, if cleanup costs are assessed 
proportionate to the amount of waste to be cleaned, the municipality bears the lion's share 
of the cost. Meanwhile, assessment of costs according to the amount of hazardous 
substances in the waste facility contributed by each waste generator allows the generator to 
incur the greater cost. Assessment is often left to the discretion of the courts and as in the 
assignment of liability involves years of costly litigation. 
Supporters of the Superfund program def end the basic features of the policy as 
essential to cleanup efforts relative to past hazardous waste sites. Strict liability, supporters 
assert, facilitates designation of responsible parties and assignment of costs. Further, 
Superfund provides strong disincentives in order to prevent the recurrence of indiscriminant 
hazardous disposal. Unfortunately, practice does not bear out the assertions of Superfund 
supporters. Rather, program detractors point to the myriad of deficiencies in Superfund 
implementation, e.g. excessive clean up and mitigation levels, unwillingness of EPA to 
initiate new cleanup technologies, usurpation of state remediation programs, ceaseless 
litigation on liability, etc., as reasons to move from the contentious Superfund to more 
collaborative and flexible programs for remediation and redevelopment of brown£elds. 
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A subheading in Soesilo and Wilson (1997, p. 8) reads, "How Clean is Clean?" The 
conservative approach is to remediate contaminated sites to a pristine condition. However, 
given the limited resources of any government program, the temporal constraints, and the 
sheer quantity of contaminated sites such an approach is impractical. The answer seem to lie 
in risk assessment based upon scientific standards and current and future land-use 
requirements (Soesilo and Wilson, 1997). Risk-based standards and site assessment are 
typically setting site remediation criteria. Institutional controls such as land-use restrictions 
are usually established to prohibit certain property uses that may degrade site mitigation as 
well as to minimize possible exposure. 
Technical uncertainty still plagues risk-based and site assessment (Davis, 1993). 
Estimating risks and policy formulation and implementation are compromised by technical 
uncertainty. The completeness and validity of data submitted to environmental agencies can 
impede remediation efforts. Compliance with data generation improves through continued 
technological advances. Yet, uncertainty exists in the science behind site assessment. Issues 
of dose extrapolation (the toxicity values of chemicals), exposure evaluation of mixtures of 
chemicals, human exposure (extrapolated from animal studies, often on-site), mathematical 
models (to estimate the nature and magnitude of human exposure), and analytical 
methodology ~aboratoi:y results from field samples) can impact the process, results and 
conclusions of risk based assessments (Soesilo and Wilson, 1997). 
As is the case with many government initiatives, the larger issue confronting 
remediation of toxic waste sites is cost. It is generally cheaper for commercial interests to 
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merely locate on suburban greenfields than redeveloping urban sites on contaminated land. 
Yet, brownfield redevelopment has been most successful where property values have 
escalated and even tainted land has become valuable. But, where developable land is not at a 
premium, government must often provide financial incentives for redevelopment to occur. 
Greater flexibility is considered essential to successful brownfield remediation. 
Unlike the Superfund standard set in the late 1970's, current trends in hazardous waste site 
remediation are cost-efficient, situational, and cooperative. Limiting liability of potential 
purchasers of contaminated sites is of primary concern to lenders as well as to potential 
owners. Such limits on civil liability are often assured by states that generally provide 
economic incentives to commercial redevelopment of brown£elds. Moreover, costs are 
contained through risk-based or site-assessment standards of remediation, whereby cleanup 
is brought to a level concomitant with prospective land-use. Also, government must engage 
in public-private partnerships to achieve brownfield remediation for cleanup, financing, and 
redevelopment. Finally, state and local dominion over policies and programs allows greater 
programmatic flexibility to be achieved with brownfield remediation not possible under the 
highly rigid standards, and centralized authority, of CERCLA. 
SECTION FIVE-EMERGING ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Positivist Contra Postmodern: Creating Hybrid Administrative Models 
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Public service organizations are evolving. The ontological roots of administration 
have long derived from attempts to reform governance. Consider Woodrow Wilson and the 
Progressive Movement. While public service organizations have not abandoned out-moded 
hierarchical organizational structures, nonetheless the public sector has come to embrace 
incremental innovation and evolutionary change. The implicit recognition of the significant 
revelations of the postmodern epoch have spurred an interest, from both theorists as well as 
practitioners, in revising administrative organizations so as to better perform the functions 
of governance. 
First, the positivist hierarchical organizational model customarily employed by much 
of the public sector, by its very nature, fosters competition rather than collaboration. 
Positivist organizations are largely based upon the competitive environment that is essential 
to the Weberian model. The resultant territorialism and back-biting among, and often 
within, administrative agencies result in unrealized efficiencies. Bureaucracy, by vesting 
power in the hands of appointed officials, is inherently anti-democratic. Hierarchy, by 
excluding the voices of those outside the organization, is explicitly anti-democratic. 
The American democratic political system is not oriented towards fostering a 
competitive hierarchical organizational model. Political processes are overtly diffuse and 
based on forming fluid coalitions around specific policy objectives. As a result, the focus of 
public administration has increasingly turned towards promoting cooperation, and 
collaboration. Working towards common goals, in a collaborative manner, results in policy 
implementation that usually works, for all parties become vested in achieving positive policy 
outcomes. 
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Secondly, the lack of a clear policy mandate from policy makers serves to impair an 
administrative agency's ability to promulgate efficacious policy. Here administrative 
discretion takes hold. While a legislature could, and sometimes does, lay out clear policy 
goals, generally the political fragmentation of legislative institutions does not serve a 
discernible, and singular public interest. Rather, legislative bodies are rife with divisiveness, 
strategic coalition building, as well as self-interested and self-serving politicians. Often, this 
diffusion of political power in policy-making circles leads to muddled policy goals. The 
nature of the political process does not readily lend itself to the strict positivist organizational 
system administrators hold out to be an ideal theoretical model. 
Thirdly, traditional bureaucratic models ignore discourse within decision-making 
structures. The importance of communicative processes in modern society require discourse 
laden applications in organizational systems. Collaboration depends upon candid discourse. 
Traditional hierarchy, with its emphasis upon rigid decision-making structures predicated 
upon linear horizontal communication, cannot foster collaborative and democratic processes 
that, of necessity rely upon complex and inclusive communication networks. 
Yet, public sector organizations are, for practical reasons, unable to completely 
abandon traditional hierarchical structures. By and large, the state's legal, or constitutional, 
infrastructure depends upon the separation of powers doctrine to thwart usurpation of 
power by any single governmental body. This mandated diffusion of power generally 
employs executive branch administrative agencies that are accountable to legislative 
authority. Increasingly, legislatures are overseeing administrative action to curb bureaucratic 
excesses. More often, however, judicial review of administrative activity reins in the harmful 
effects of administrative discretion run amok. In addition, the constraints of civil service 
classification and rigid collective bargaining agreements serve to thwart revolutionary 
transformation of bureaucratic hierarchy. 
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Contemporary hybrid public sector organizational structures are now predicated 
upon several key, postmodern administrative tenets: communicating through information 
technologies (IT) in order to increase agency effectiveness and citizen participation; fostering 
collaboration amongst stakeholders to achieve mutually held policy goals; fostering policy 
objectives that promote comprehensive community goals and further democratic processes; 
and laterally and horizontally disintegrating governmental structures so as to achieve a 
collaborative decision-making process. 
Government organizations are fundamentally information processing systems. 
Outputs in government are, largely, the result of the application of human resources to 
achieve policy objectives. The collective philosophy and institutional culture of any sizable 
organization can be indicative of the status of the human capital within that organization. 
Organizational philosophy and corporate culture often translate into decision-making 
systems whereby human resources are considered a, relatively, greater asset within the 
organization (I--Iall, 1991). If organizations are but decision-making systems, then the life-
blood of those systems is the extant communicative network. When, if, and how well an 
organization communicates forms the basis for effective and efficient decision-making and 
policy implementation. Conversely, organizational frameworks form the basis of 
communicative networks. Decision-making is promulgated through formal communicative 
networks, e.g. meetings, hierarchy, and the implicit coercion in power relationships, or 
through the informal network of gossip, water cooler conferences, and coalitions within the 
orgaruzat1on. 
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The study of cultural hermeneutics provides a basis for advancing administrative 
communicative structures (McKinney and Howard, 1998). Hermeneutics comprises 
principles for enhancing understanding. It is a manner of interpretation that deals with 
understanding underlying or disguised meaning. Such an approach entails immersion in the 
cultural context of the speaker. Only by undertaking such deep readings of text will the 
researcher truly grasp the meaning of what is said. Communicative structures, based upon 
developing collaboration and enhancing cooperation, are essential for hybrid organizational 
systems. 
Increasingly, government organizations are being hard pressed to provide more 
services with ever shrinking resources. Effective use of the workforce is key to engendering 
efficient implementation outcomes. The de-centralization of administrative functions of 
government organizations yields efficiencies in both the implementation of policy as well as 
the investment in human capital (Nigro, 1983). "Hierarchy tends to produce self-protective, 
obsequious, rule obsessed behavior[s]," (Zajac, Al-Kazemi, 1997). 
From a public management perspective vertically decentralized decision-making 
structures allow for affective organizational commitment, as well as a strong bond between 
the employee and the employing organization (Nyhan, 1999). Affective commitment is 
based upon: a strong belief in, and acceptance of, organizational goals; willingness to exert 
effort on the organization's behalf; and desire to maintain membership in the organization. 
This sense of allegiance depends on the measure of trust that employees display towards the 
organization. Organizational leaders can elicit employee trust by encouraging open 
communication, discretionary decision-making, and employee participation through feed-
back (Bell, 1997). 
54 
Although the horizontal system of governmental bureaucracy has been disintegrated 
so as to allow relatively expanded decentralized organizational decision-making, nevertheless 
such an accomplishment belies the continued reification within the vertical decision-making 
structures (at the point of citizen service or in the field). It is very likely, that governmental 
organizations are constrained as to the extent of employee discretion allowable in the pursuit 
of administrative activity, particularly at the point of service. Within a positivist, hierarchical 
structure standard operating procedures are not merely instruments of reification. Rather, 
they provide a measure of consistency, control, and continuity in organizational decision-
making. 
Can government organizations increase employee discretion while maintaining 
organizational continuity and policy-making consistency? The answer may be to allow 
heightened employee input at the inception of implementation processes so as to utilize a 
postmodern-positivist hybrid management technique known as back-ward mapping 
(Elmore, 1979). 
Backward mapping is an inversion of the traditional hierarchical (top-down), rational 
implementation process. First, backward mapping a policy or program begins with the 
expression of specific outcomes and proceeds backwards (bottom-up) in order to elicit 
successful implementation strategies that fulfill those explicit outcomes. Bryson (1995) 
encourages a similar procedure in following the organizational strategic planning process. 
Unfortunately, while strategic planning itself may be an adaptive attempt to fuse postmodern 
principles to a thoroughly positivist, hierarchical organizational framework, the synergies 
from the two conceptualizations may be lost in the fixed rigidity of the strategic planning 
process as outlined by Bryson. 
Planning is based on the capacity for organizational learning. It is at once both 
proactive and inflexible. Organizational goals are the centerpiece of planning functions 
(McKinney and Howard, 1998). Short-term objectives are gleaned from long-term 
operational goals. Implementation strategies are created to produce desired outcomes. 
Evaluation and assessment systems are utilized to measure progress towards those goals. 
Such a system is eminently rational and fundamentally untenable given both the 
unpredictability of external political forces brought to bear on administrative agencies, and 
the recalcitrance of hierarchical organizational structures. 
Catalysts for Emerging Systems: Public Entrepreneurs 
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Public entrepreneurs are playing a role as catalysts for government reform and the 
application of fresh organizational perspectives. Melchior (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) 
describes public entrepreneurs as able to explain the dynamic nature of political transactions 
and thereby shift the preferences of policy actors by providing new information regarding 
political ends and means. Public entrepreneurs are able to organize resources in new ways in 
order to produce and distribute services more efficiently. In the public sector the creation of 
profit gives way to the creation of new delivery systems and increased political advantage for 
the entrepreneur. All this is viewed through the lens of a transactional model. The focus on 
transactions within the political system has an emotional appeal to political actors. Often, 
the public entrepreneur links issues together so as to form a broad coalition of supporters. 
According to Melchior, two obstacles block the public entrepreneur from achieving 
policy goals: an entrenched bureaucracy that remains too rigid to cope well with the rapid 
pace of change in modem community politics; and the public sector's lack of efficiency in 
providing goods and services (can be countervailed through advances in IT and management 
control systems). 
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Reinventing government may be considered a euphemism for market-oriented, 
decentralized management control structures, in emulation of those of the private sector. 
However, the public sector would do well not to fully embrace market principles, for 
governance does not conform to many of the assumptions that underlie the market. 
Moreover, market principles tend to shift with the prevailing winds, and do not form an 
invariable source of validation for even the capitalist system. Therefore, the market should 
not be an ideological foundation for governance. For example, without the context of the 
capitalist system that forms the basis of private entrepreneurship, the pursuit of profit, 
public entrepreneurs are inevitably caught in the dichotomy of maximizing self-interest while 
simultaneously achieving collective policy goals. The market cannot be equated to the policy 
making arena. And, public entrepreneurs should likely be cast in an entirely different light, 
with corresponding alternative nomenclature. 
Adaptive, or Hybrid, Organizational Systems 
Balk (1996), however, does not apologize for public sector organizations. While 
positivist organizational theory derives, primarily, from economic institutions, government 
organizations intrinsically stem from political institutions. Irrespective of system origin, 
organizational effectiveness, in general, is a direct function of organizational flexibility. The 
rapidity with which an organization undergoes change when confronted by unforeseen 
circumstances speaks directly to the organizational structure. Adaptive organizational 
structures readily yield to flexibility by design and throughout the decision-making process. 
Balk sees organizational structure along the lines of a micro/ macro environment. 
External responsibilities are the manifestations of organizational behavior, e.g. professional 
competence, deference to executive authority, etc.. Balk cites the ethical exercise of power 
in government institutions as key to preserving the legitimacy and authority of the 
orgaruzation. Furthermore, Balk asserts an internal responsibility within the organization 
whereby professionals are obligated to serve the best interests of the public; improve 
organizational effectiveness; enhance the role of government (presumably in a democratic 
fashion); either comply with, or reject, directives; and protect critical social values. 
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Public agency democracy rests upon a paradox. Central to the tension between 
compliance with, and opposition to, authority is the source of moral legitimacy. As 
expressed by Weber, the basis for order and consensus within a public organization is a 
network of role-directed responsibilities and behaviors. But, hierarchical structures serve to 
stifle any gasp of flexibility. According to Foucault, the hierarchical system is a 
power/knowledge regime that primarily serves to legitimize itself. Hence, how, either in the 
role of responsible organizational member or in the role of citizen, can a public servant 
express contention with agency policies? Reformers must act with "regime values" 
dedicated to maintaining fundamental political order (Balk, 1996). Organizational systems 
require constant internal corrections to adapt to evermore volatile circumstances. 
Van Warts (1998) stresses a value-based system for public organizational structures 
in order to clarify organizational mission, goals, and methods. The five sources of value sets 
are personal values, professional values, organizational values, legal values, and public 
interest values. Sources compete for supremacy and can often conflict with one another. 
Administrators are expected to have 'civic integrity' an appreciation of the Constitution and 
the political-legal system with its underlying legitimacy (Van Warts, 1998). Civic integrity 
also includes cultural values such as honesty; consistency (to act from principle rather than 
whim); coherence (to connect examples with principles); reciprocity (the 'Golden Rule'). 
Van Warts' organizational values pays homage to the buzzwords of public 
management techniques, e.g. TQM, management revolution, re-engineering government. 
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Yet, in postmodern fashion, Van Warts emphasizes that decision-makers must constantly 
have an eye towards the citizens that government officials are charged to serve. The general 
public interest must not merely be a locus of establishing organizational goals, but a true 
source of administrative legitimacy. Although Van Warts' organizational theory rests on a 
positivist framework, the theory seeks to incorporate postmodern principles that address 
participation, communication, and consensus. 
Organizational structures are divided into four categories according to Van Warts: 
rational style (theoretically value independent and analytical); hierarchical style (values 
predictability and security therefore tries to maintain a status quo); consensual style (reduces 
uncertainty through interaction, values affiliation and mutual dependence); and adaptive 
Oearning oriented, values flexibility and change). Most organizations are hybrids of two or 
more or these organizational systems. Moreover, these categories operate within four 
cultures: rational, hierarchical, group/team, or adaptive (Van Warts, 1998, p.87-90). These 
and still other factors establish the basis for organizational values. Current trends include 
the disintegration of organizational structures, focus upon customer satisfaction, and 
adaptive, or flexible, systems that emphasize information technology. Van Warts (1998, p. 
107) cites three important contributions of organizational values: 
1. midlevel focus-reflect both a long-range environment and short-term disturbances 
2. recognizes that organizations are an instrument of the public-healthy, balanced 
institutions serve the public interest well, while serving organizational needs 
3. emphasize unique needs of the system and environment-organizations are a reflection 
of the changing needs of society, e.g. water-quality may be privatized. 
The three concerns with a focus upon organizational values are: 
1. midlevel focus may degenerate into a short-term focus or a crisis-of-the-day mentality 
2. reification-organizations become self-perpetuating and self-serving 
3. degeneration into bureaupathologies, a la Gerald Caiden (1991), whereby strong 
attributes become corrupted. 
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Similarly, the postmodern emphasis upon language and communication is 
permeating administrative organizational theory. Watson (Lynch and Dicker, 1998) assails 
the use of bureaucratese, or technocratic double-speak. He establishes a typology, of the 
misuse of language by administrative organizations, that includes: euphemism, words that 
soften or distort harsh realities; jargon, the specialized language that serves to exclude those 
outside of a specialized profession; complex syntax, structuring words so as to confuse, or 
obstruct meaning; voluminosity, the adding of redundancy to overwhelm the audience; and 
bloating, the creation of hyperbole to exaggerate importance. The use of bureaucratese 
depersonalizes the message, removes accountability, creates misunderstanding, and develops 
an exclusionary administrative process. Watson proposes that plain English replace 
bureaucratese. Likewise, he advocates the adoption of values and ethics into the 
bureaucratic vocabulary. Unlike Wittgenstein's proposed separation of metaphysical and 
practical language, Watson would encourage the ready application of plain-speak in order to 
create a new administrative mindset. An appreciation of the power of language and how it 
actually constructs administrative issues will serve to better democratize public sector 
orgaruzations. 
Technology holds promise for both improving administrative systems and allowing 
increased levels of participation. However, in and of itself, an IT focus is not enough. 
Rather, the laterally and horizontally disintegrated decision-making structure is an absolute 
requisite for implementing collaborative, team-centered approaches toward problem-solving. 
Therefore, public sector organizations are seemingly moving away from rigid hierarchy and 
toward process-based organizational structures that emphasize greater flexibility. Key 
elements to implementation of process-based systems are: a systematic managerial 
knowledge of internal and external pressures (emphasis upon political pressure); 
organizational designs supportive of deployment of resources suited towards delivery 
adaptive, as well as strategic, implementation; and proper (read as complete as possible) 
information systems to enable new process designs (Osborne, 1998). 
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Osborne's scheme derives from both emergent strategies (bottom-up) and intended 
strategies (top-down). Emergent strategies (more like tactics) are very much fluid and 
incremental by nature, and arise from daily activities, while intended strategies arise from 
formal planning and are thereby structured towards achieving specific, relatively, long-range 
goals. Focusing on emergent strategies, "alters the traditional relationship between planning 
and control ... where once control activities focused on implementing plans, this [new] view 
suggests how control systems play a role in strategic adaptation (Osborne, 1998, p. 487)." 
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SECTION SIX-CONCLUSIONS 
Hybrid Organizational Systems: The Environmental Protection Agency 
Typically, public sector organizations currently employ some type of hybrid 
organizational solutions to address the seemingly intractable difficulties of administration 
and government. Strictly positivist organizational structures have been thoroughly 
discredited as means to provide a serviceable framework for public administration. 
Hierarchy suffers from disallowing democratic processes and is no longer considered viable, 
or sustainable, as a method of promoting organizational efficiency or effectiveness. Given 
that empirical knowledge affirms power in a relationship of mutual signification, reliance 
upon positivist systems perpetuates an exclusionary social, economic, and political system. 
The unremitting progression of the Information Age has witnessed significant 
cultural shifts that continue to render exclusively positivist organizations obsolete. Hierarchy 
can no longer be considered a legitimate or plausible method of structuring public decision-
making systems. Rather, the postmodern world demands flexible, collaborative, and 
decentralized decision-making structures that support policy implementation in an era of 
fragmented and diverse perspectives wherein knowledge is commonly recognized as 
subjective. 
Postmodernism seeks to understand the world as a series of inter-relationships. In 
turn, the interconnectivity of social interactions is predicated upon open and effective 
communications and forthright communicative systems. In essence, true democracy reflects 
the postmodern vision of communicative action. Democratic processes are a reflection of 
open and effective communication amongst the various participants. 
Positivist systems are quite simply not enough. Although many public sector 
organizations may not be fully cognizant, they have already embraced and successfully 
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incorporated many postmodern tenets into the extant hierarchical organizational framework. 
Postmodern organizational methods directly address the theoretical and operational voids 
found in positivist era administrative systems, allowing adaptability, communicative 
opportunity, and democratic participation. 
The EPA is thoroughly rooted in positivist philosophical systems and hierarchical 
organizational structure. With few exceptions, the agency depends on modem, empirical 
methods to formulate policy and promulgate regulations. Contemplate the EP A's failure 
with the Superfund program. Despite the extensive scientific data and technology that EPA, 
and its minions, generated and relied upon to substantiate pristine levels of hazardous waste 
clean up, the organizational effort expended was inadequate to surmount the doubts as to 
the efficacy of the policy. Both in public opinion and in the minds of key decision-makers 
the EPA was savaged as to whether the agency was going too far in its insistence upon a 
fixed level of remediation, or not far enough. In addition, EP A's insistence upon a standard 
of strict liability for Superfund sites produced an adversarial, needlessly, litigious relationship 
with potentially responsible parties. As an unintended consequence the legal labyrinth that 
Superfund wrought unexpectedly came to burden municipal landfills and individual property 
owners. Most importantly, Superfund's rigid, positivist standards precluded the remediation 
and redevelopment of many urban brownfields, keeping potentially developable and valuable 
property perennially despoiled. 
As a result of the reinvention of government, the EPA is now able to develop 
significantly more flexible organizational instruments. Project XL, along with cooperative 
regulatory systems and environmental programs, allow for the creation of a collaborative and 
adaptive regulatory process between the regulating agency and regulated institutions. 
Increased democratization of the regulatory process could be considered de factor result of 
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the new found emphasis upon collaboration and programmatic flexibility as those subject to 
agency regulation have a hand in formulating creative solutions to complex environmental 
issues. Habermas keenly recognized the link between collaborative decision-making and 
increased levels of democratic participation. 
The Theory of Communicative Action 
The philosophical middle ground between positivism and postmodernism, seems to 
be firmly held by Jurgen Habermas (Bohman, 1999). Habermas' philosophy is firmly rooted 
in the structuralist school. While his theory of communicative action essentially bridges 
modem and postmodern philosophies, Habermas thoroughly rejects rationality's fac;:ade of 
empiricism in favor of the methodological pluralism that postmodernism encourages. From 
a practical aspect, Habermas emphasizes the purpose and goals of constitutive forms of 
knowledge (Alexander; Mandlebaum, Mazza, and Burchell, 1996). His intent is two-fold. 
First, Habermas is interested in liberating individuals from relations of force, unconscious 
constraints, and dependence. Second, Habermas intends to increase mutual understanding 
and unimpeded communication, in order to effect truly democratic decision-making. 
Moreover, Habermas proceeds to outline an area of study that he entitles critical 
reflective knowledge that forms the basis of a prescription for individual and societal action. 
Strategic action, the antithesis of communicative action, is premised upon power, influence, 
manipulation, and distorted communication so as to order participant behavior into 
conformance of desired objectives (Alexander; Mandlebaum, Mazza, and Burchell, 1996). 
Implicitly Habermas' critical reflective knowledge takes the form of the age-old dichotomy 
between social, or collective, action and individual self-interest. 
From an eminently practical perspective, Habermas recognizes that democracy 
demands cooperation and collaborative systems. The theory of communicative action relies 
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upon forthright communication as the preferred method of achieving consensus through 
collaboration. Further, Habermasian communicative action is innately democratic for it 
absolutely insists upon allowing all parties with a legitimate argument to participate by freely 
expressing a point of view. For Habermas, consensus is borne of the willingness to hear and 
understand opposing perspectives (Skollerhom, 1998). While Habermas' ideal speech 
situation has been assailed as unrealistic, and foundational, a la Kant, it is essential to bear in 
mind that Habermas advocates reflective communication as a method of identifying and 
correcting communicative and ideological distortion in order to exploit latent individual 
moral and ethical principles. 
Habermas seeks to reconcile the differences among various theories and across 
assorted disciplines. The theory of communicative action is founded on a concept of 
discursive practice that embraces a multi-disciplinary approach that unites, rather than 
fragmenting, the social sciences. This pluralistic approach to social research is reflected both 
in the spirit and execution of this essay in as much as it adopts a theory of hybrid 
organizational systems as well as the application of diverse, yet cohesive, theoretical 
frameworks. Habermas considers this discursive approach to inquiry to be methodological 
pluralism (Bohman, 1999). In addition, Habermas recognized that critical social theory had a 
sustained resolve to procure the achievement of the various epistemic goals of specific 
disciplines while simultaneously preserving essential critical self-reflection amongst the 
branches of social science. In this manner Habermas could attest to the relative legitimacy 
of each constituent knowledge form, theory, and methodological approach. Habermas' 
resourcefulness allows social scientists to combine seemingly disparate, even contradictory, 
methods, theories, and epistemic goals into a coherent whole, as is the case in the natural 
sciences. 
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Ultimately, Habermas seeks to preserve all fruitful avenues of inquiry within the 
social sciences. Habermas claims that by employing a discursive approach to social science 
inquiry, " ... the normative contents of a humane social life can be introduced in an 
unsuspicious way by means of a communication theory, without having to smuggle them in 
secretly by way of a philosophy of history ... there is no obligation to proceed only according 
to action theory, to speak only of agents and their fate, acts and consequences. It becomes 
possible also to speak of the characteristics of life-worlds in which agents and collectives or 
individual subjects move ... (Dews, 1986; p. 113)" In one fell swoop Habermas condemns 
rationalism as well as the Hegelian branch of Western philosophy. Characteristically, 
Habermas adopts a structuralist stance as a method of unearthing the origins of social 
domination and communicative action as a means of efficaciously addressing the 
consequences of institutionalized power. 
Habermas' theory of communicative action is eminently preferable to a strictly liberal 
positivist orientation. Rationalism, based on individual self-interest, is particularly 
detrimental to organizations involved in the planning and policy-making arena and overtly 
repugnant to democratic processes in general. In a system founded on self-interest policy 
issues quickly become mired in a zero-sum game whereby any party with a power-knowledge 
advantage secures at least partial benefit. Habermas' system of sincere debate allows parties 
to mutually reach a shared understanding. The practical difference in philosophical 
approaches is witnessed in the EPA's woeful entanglement with Superfund and the relative 
success of Project XL initiatives, like Atlantic Steel. 
Regulation and the Democratic Process 
Habermas' communicative theory may be considered an instrument for facilitating 
open and effective discourse in the context of creating a more democratic decision-making 
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process. In potentially exclusionary policy making arenas, such as administrative regulation 
and planning, discourse and collaboration are requisite for reinstituting democratic 
processes. Without the impetus to reconfigure the decision-making process, classical 
organizational systems will remain, for all intents and purposes, closed to those outside the 
immediate policy-making circle. In positivist, empirical terms the administrative agency has 
a question and comment period, while planning agencies rely upon the open-hearing to 
encourage public participation. Yet, are these heavily institutionalized methods of 
participation, in and of themselves, sufficient to cull participation and broaden 
democratization of the regulatory process? Generally, decisions that significantly impact an 
individual, a constituent group, or even an entire community are made without a sufficiently 
participatory process-witness the urban renewal debacle of the Sixties and Seventies and 
EP A's experience with the Superfund. 
Hybrid organizational systems that de-emphasize hierarchical structures in favor of 
collaborative decision-making models are foundational attempts to redress the deficiencies 
that underlie traditional, positivist organizational systems with their reliance upon technical 
expertise, empirical knowledge forms, and implicit power-knowledge relationships. Classical 
organizations are inherently undemocratic in that they naturally engage in a, fundamentally, 
closed decision-making process. Adaptive, or hybrid, organizational systems are explicitly 
democratic by systemically necessitating participation of all interested parties through open 
discourse and active collaboration. 
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